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Abstract 
 
 This paper looks at whether firms’ credit ratings are negatively affected by litigation risk 
after controlling for known factors that affect credit ratings. The conventional wisdom is that 
litigation risk and credit ratings have an inverse relationship. However, my hypothesis is that the 
inverse relationship will not be stable if the model of credit ratings has taken other factors into 
account. The methodology first constructs a model of litigation risk, and then regress the credit 
ratings on the measurement of litigation risk. Previous empirical research on litigation risk 
measurement uses industry proxies as indicators for litigation risk. In this paper, I include firm 
characteristics and the Beneish M-score (a determinant for earnings manipulation) in addition to 
the industry proxy to construct an alternative model measuring litigation risk. I find that 
supplementing the Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994a, b; hereafter FPS) industry proxy with 
measures of firm characteristics improves predictive ability. In the model of credit ratings, I find 
that the change of litigation risk has a negative correlation with the credit ratings. However, the 
negative coefficient on the change of litigation risk changes to a positive one after controlling for 
other variables such as firm size, return on asset, and interest coverage ratio. This finding 
provides support for the hypothesis that the negative correlation between the credit ratings and 
litigation risk is not stable. This suggests that credit ratings may not incorporate litigation risk 
specifically although litigation can lead to firms’ financial damage and reputation crisis. 
However, the negative coefficient on the change of litigation risk remains unchanged when I 
control for the year fixed effects. I also find a negative correlation between the year 2007 and 
credit ratings due to financial crisis. The results are not conclusive given the likely simultaneous 
determination of litigation risk and credit ratings.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 | P a g e  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 I gratefully acknowledge the support and guidance of Professor Ananda Ganguly, the 
Morcos F. Massoud Associate Professor of Accounting and George R. Roberts Fellow at 
Claremont McKenna College, and most especially my thesis reader. I also want to recognize the 
help and contribution of Professor Janet Smith, who has provided insightful suggestions and 
recommendations in the course of Seminar in Research Methods. Without their careful 
supervision and continuous encouragement, this thesis would not have been possible.  
 Also, I want to extend my deepest thanks to my parents and friends for listening to 
complains, offering feedback, and just being there behind me throughout the whole semester and 
always. The mental support from all these great people has made the completion of this paper 
faster and nicer. 
 Finally, my thanks also go out to Claremont McKenna College (CMC), a wonderful 
liberal arts college that has granted me academic resources, nice facilities, and great snack time if 
I happen to stay up late in the computer lab. The education and experience that I have gained at 
CMC is incomparable to anywhere else imaginable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 | P a g e  
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ 3 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. 4 
I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 6 
II. Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 7 
a. Discussion of Litigation Risk .................................................................................... 7 
b. Discussion of Credit Ratings from Credit Agencies ............................................... 10 
III. Methodology and Research Question .......................................................................... 11 
a. Research Question ................................................................................................... 11 
b. Measuring Litigation Risk ....................................................................................... 12 
c. Measuring the Relationship between Credit Ratings and Litigation Risk .............. 16 
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................... 18 
a. The Model of Litigation Risk .................................................................................. 18 
b. The Model of Credit Ratings ................................................................................... 19 
V. Results ........................................................................................................................... 20 
a. Litigation Risk Probit Regression ........................................................................... 20 
b. Credit Ratings OLS Regression .............................................................................. 22 
c. Discussion of Fixed Effects ..................................................................................... 24 
d. Discussion of Endogeneity ...................................................................................... 25 
VI. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 26 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 29 
References ......................................................................................................................... 41 
 
6 | P a g e  
 
Credit Ratings and Firm Litigation Risk 
I. Introduction 
 
In this paper, I examine whether firms’ credit ratings are negatively affected by litigation 
risk if other factors such as firm characteristics are included in the model. I first construct a 
model of litigation risk, and then use the measurement as a variable in the regression of credit 
ratings. My paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I construct a new model to 
measure the litigation risk by including variables such as Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994a, 
b; hereafter FPS) industry proxy, firm size indicators, the Beneish M-score and firm 
characteristics. Second, I use the model of litigation risk to obtain the estimated parameters on 
independent variables to measure the level of litigation risk, which is then used in the model of 
credit ratings to test the negative correlation between firms’ litigation risk and credit ratings. 
Since I get a highly significant positive coefficient on the level of litigation risk, I also include 
the change of litigation risk to test for consistency of correlation, and the litigation risk squared 
to test for whether there is a convergence of the correlation in the long-term, controlling for other 
related firm characteristics that affect credit ratings.  
In the model of litigation risk, I find that supplementing the FPS industry proxy with 
measures of firm characteristics improves predictive ability according to the increase in the 
Pseudo-R-Squared. In the model of credit ratings, I find that the change of litigation risk has a 
negative correlation with the credit ratings. However, the negative coefficient on the change of 
litigation risk changes to a positive one after controlling for other variables such as firm size, 
return on asset, and interest coverage ratio. This finding provides support for the hypothesis that 
the negative correlation between the credit ratings and litigation risk is not stable. This suggests 
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that credit ratings may not incorporate litigation risk specifically although litigation can lead to 
firms’ financial damage and reputation crisis. However, I find that the negative correlation 
between the change in litigation risk and credit ratings maintains the same after controlling for 
the year fixed effects. Also, the year 2007 has a negative association with firms’ credit ratings, 
which could be due to the financial crisis in 2007. The results are not conclusive given the likely 
simultaneous determination of litigation risk and credit ratings.   
Section II provides a literature review that discusses both litigation risk and credit ratings. 
Section III introduces the research question and the methodology constructed in this paper. 
Section IV details the sample and provides descriptive statistics of the data. Section V presents 
the findings from the models and results of regressions. This section also includes a discussion of 
endogeneity, which could have influenced the regression results. Section VI concludes.   
II. Literature Review 
 
a. Discussion of Litigation Risk 
 
Previous study defines the litigation risk as the risk of securities class action lawsuits 
(Skinner, 1994).  According to Skinner, firms’ litigation risk generally is resulted from violations 
of Rule 10b-5. The components of a Rule 10b-5 violation are “(1) a misstatement or omission of 
(2) a material fact (3) made with intent (4) that the plaintiff justifiably relied on (5) causing 
injury in connection with the purchase or sale of securities” (Skinner, 1994). Since fraud such as 
an omission of a statement item or a misrepresentation of financial statements is the major 
reasons for firms’ involvement in lawsuits, I provide below some meaningful findings from other 
empirical research about the relationship between firms’ litigation risk and earnings disclosures.  
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By examining the timeliness of total earnings news through the evolution of the 
consensus analyst forecast, scholars discover that timely revelation of fraudulent earnings news 
deter litigation for both settled and dismissed lawsuits (Donelson et al., 2012). For example, 
firms which reveal fraudulent earnings news early will lower the likelihood of litigation. Other 
literature that investigates firm disclosure and litigation risk emphasizes the internal relationship 
between these two. Donelson also finds that disclosure endogenously leads to litigation against 
firms. By using simultaneous equations methodology, Donelson was able to show that (1) firms 
with higher litigation risk are more likely to make early disclosures about impending earnings 
disappointments (preemption effect), and (2) such disclosures lower the expected lawsuit 
probability (Field et al., 2005). 
Later research has focused more on other factors that potentially affect firms’ litigation 
risk when constructing models of litigation risk measurement. Some studies use a variant of an 
industry membership called FPS proxy created by Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994a, b), 
who draw firms from four risky industries to study the relationship between litigation and 
disclosure; these industries are biotech, computer, electronics, and retail industry. For example, 
many studies use some form of dummy variable for membership in the FPS industries to 
measure litigation risk (e.g. Brown and Tucker, 2011; Donelson et al., 2010; Hribar et al., 2010). 
However, Kim and Skinner (2012) point out that the credibility and accuracy of a fixed industry 
proxy are not convincing since litigation rates in particular industries vary over time. If the 
changes in the wealth of different industries happen because of the volatile macroeconomic 
environment, litigation risk is not likely to be sustainable for particular industries or firms. 
Instead, it is more likely that economic downturns will cause losses in value that vary across 
industries and through time, and that these losses will lead to litigation (Kim, Skinner, 2012). 
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This means that the FPS industry proxy should not be the only variable to measure litigation risk 
since it is hard to identify and categorize firms and industries that always have higher possibility 
of litigation risk.  
Other than an industry membership proxy, there are firm and industry characteristics that 
make particular firms and industries generally more likely to be involved in litigation (e.g. Kim, 
Skinner, 2012). Some models of litigation risk include firm characteristics such as market 
capitalization, stock volatility and stock turnover based on the hypothesis that fraud in Rule 10b-
5 litigation depends on the size of the change in stock price, the magnitude of trading volume 
during the period of the susceptible fraud, and the stock price of public listed firms (Jones and 
Weingram, 1996a). Jones and Weingram (1996a) also find that a bigger amount of financial 
damages makes firms more likely to become a target for plaintiffs’ attorneys, which indicates 
that market value is strongly associated with litigation risk as well. Studies interpret a positive 
correlation between equity-based managerial motivations and the probability of a lawsuit (such 
as for financial statement misrepresentation and fraud) as evidence that equity-based 
compensation leads to misbehaviors of the administrative bodies (Low 2006). Further research 
find that firms that operate in high litigation risk environments provide more equity-based 
compensation to their CEOs (Jayaraman, Milbourn, 2009). CEOs who have performance-based 
compensation have incentives to be involved in aggressive financial reporting and other types of 
opportunistic behavior that increases likelihood of lawsuits (Dechow et al., 1996). Previous 
research also includes several proxies for the nature of the firms’ investment opportunities, such 
as Working Capital, Market-to-Book ratio, Research &Development intensity, and ratio of 
Property Plant & Equipment to total assets, which affect corporate policies such as executive 
compensation, capital structure, and payout policy that could affect litigation risk (Smith and 
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Watts, 1992). Kim and Skinner (2012) also include the ratio of goodwill to assets to measure the 
extent of the firms’ Merger & Acquisition activities, which likely increases litigation risk.  
While corporate governance and insider trading variables are also possible indicators of 
the optimism of management that increase firms’ exposure to litigation, there are problems and 
limitations to include these variables in litigation risk measurement. First, it is not clear whether 
prior securities litigation is caused by opportunism in the management team instead of being 
driven by unexpectedly negative outcomes. While it is obvious that extreme forms of 
opportunism such as earnings management lead to litigation, these lawsuits are from a relatively 
small part of the population of securities class action suits. Second, corporate governance and 
insider trading data are not fully disclosed and publicly available compared to data on firm 
characteristics which constrains sample sizes and perhaps leads to a biased sample selection 
(Kim, Skinner, 2012).  
b. Discussion of Credit Ratings from Credit Agencies 
 
Major credit rating agencies, including Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s have 
become an important subject of investigation and legislation given their complex structure of 
rating systems and conflict of interest, which are criticized by many regulative bodies and 
legislative bodies (Zhou, Kumar, 2012). For example, rating agencies have been criticized for 
their credit rating analysis and organization administration after the scandal of Enron and the 
mortgage crisis during the financial distress in the early 2000s. Zhou and Kumar (2012) state that 
the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech are frequently used for credit agencies to 
protect themselves against civil liability for their ratings. As information intermediaries on behalf 
of bondholders, credit agencies collect and process issuers’ financial information, as well as 
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produce estimates of default risk in the form of ratings (Gorton, Winton, 2003). Since the rating 
agencies perform undisclosed investigations and are paid by bond issuers instead of investors, 
many scholars are concerned about the possibility that importance of reputation, litigation and 
competition will be incentives for a conflict of interest (Kraft, 2008). Kraft gives the following 
examples in her paper: reputational concerns could be a motivation for rating agencies to expend 
effort to learn more in a setting in which the agency optimally chooses coarse ratings without 
sufficient evidence; the impact of legal liability can lead to “misrating” on the rating agency’s 
behavior; and the higher legal liability induces the rating agency to reduce the number of ratings. 
If the legal liability increases asymmetrically, which means that higher legal liability only for 
ratings deemed later to be too high, the rating agency would then increase its downward bias in 
ratings to respond (Goel, Thakor, 2010). 
III. Methodology and Research Question 
 
a. Research Question 
 
Given the conflict of interests and the “black box” of agencies’ rating systems, I want to 
investigate the correlation between firms’ litigation risk and credit ratings through a regression 
that controls for other firm characteristics. There is little research that has done an explicit 
analysis of the correlation between firms’ litigation risk and credit ratings. If we assume rating 
agencies are efficient information processing intermediaries, the conventional wisdom is that 
higher litigation risk will result in a lower credit rating since a higher litigation risk increases the 
probability of lawsuits, which either increases financial damage or decreases expected return on 
the business operations of firms. However, the negative correlation between litigation risk and 
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credit ratings will not be stable if credit agencies only use a rough indicator of litigation risk 
which is easily affected by other factors considered in the rating system. Also, credit agencies 
may only put little weight on litigation risk relative to other factors influencing the rating result. 
Thus, the litigation risk will not be negatively correlated with the credit rating or the correlation 
may not be statistically significant if the model includes other known factors that affect credit 
ratings. 
b. Measuring Litigation Risk 
 
To construct a model of litigation risk, I include FPS industry proxy, firm characteristics, 
and firm size indicators as variables in the measurement. Since previous studies find that the 
firms’ earning disclosure is correlated with litigation risk, I also include the Beneish M-score in 
the model of litigation risk, which measures the likelihood of earnings manipulation. I will 
explain the rationale for using each variable in detail in the following paragraphs. 
The model of litigation risk is: 
Sued=β0+β1(FPSPROXY)+β2(MKVALT)+β3(BKMK)+β4(WC)+β5(FINRK)+β6(VOLATILITY)
+β7(PE)+β8(GP)+β9(RDINTEN)+β10(BMSCORE)+β11(BIG)+β12(SMALL)+ε 
A number of papers use some variant of the FPS industry proxy for litigation risk. For 
example, Field (2005) uses industry membership to measure litigation risk but develops their 
own measure by looking at industry litigation rates during the period before the sample test 
period (1988-1994) and sorting industries according to whether they had litigation rates above or 
below the median. In my paper, I use a dummy variable for membership in the FPS industry to 
measure litigation risk.  
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Fama and French (1992) use market capitalization and book-to-market ratios to explain 
cross-sectional variation on market returns. In my paper, I use these two variables to indicate the 
market risk, which is defined as “the risk of losses in on- and off-balance sheet positions arising 
from movements in market prices” (Fama, French, 1992). The market capitalization is measured 
as the total market value (MKVALT). Book-to-market equity ratio is measured as the book value 
per share (BKVLPS) multiplied by common shares outstanding (CSHO), then divided by the 
market value. I also included the working capital, which was calculated as the difference 
between the total current asset (ACT) and the total current liability (LCT).  
Previous literature argues that high assets and investment in working capital increase 
rating change (Sufi, 2009). Thus, I include the level of working capital measured as the 
difference between the total current assets and the total current liabilities. I also include the 
indicator of financial risk, stock volatility and price/earnings ratio to predict the firm’s future 
performance. The PP&E over total assets ratio indicates the fixed cost and the risk of financial 
distress for a company, which predicts the information of financial risk. I also include stock 
volatility, calculated by the difference between the annual closing price (PRCC_F) at time (t) and 
the annual closing price (PRCC_F) at time (t-1) divided by the annual closing price (PRCC_F) at 
time (t-1). The stock price over earnings ratio was calculated by dividing the annual closing price 
(PRCC_F) over basic earnings per share excluding extraordinary items (EPSPX). The stock 
volatility and P/E ratio indicate the satisfaction of investors and shareholders, decreasing the 
leverage of a company. These three factors thus reduce agency risk and information risk.  
Cantor and Packer (1995) contend that the higher the profit, the lower the likelihood of 
financial distress and default, which leads to firms’ higher ratings. Thus, I include the gross 
profit (GP) in my model. Firms which practice R&D activities reduce their risk of debt 
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significantly. Previous literature also shows that goodwill over asset ratio indicates the likelihood 
of a firm’s future involvement in a merger and acquisition (Kim, Skinner, 2012). Thus I include 
the research and development expense (XRD) over total assets ratio, which indicates the stability 
of firms’ corporate governance. I also include two binary variables as indicators for big firms and 
small firms since I think the top 25% and the bottom 25% of firms (in terms of firm size) will be 
expected to have an effect on the level of litigation risk.  
Finally, I include the Beneish M-Score which looks to determine whether a company has 
manipulated its earnings. This model consists of eight ratios that capture either financial 
statement distortions resulted from earnings manipulation (DSR, AQI, DEPI and Accruals) or 
indicate a predisposition towards engagement in earnings manipulation (GMI, SGI, SGAI, 
LEVI). The predictive ratios focusing on financial statement distortions capture unusual 
accumulations in receivables (DSR, indicative of revenue inflation), unusual expense 
capitalization and declines in depreciation (AQI and DEPI, both indicative of expense deflation), 
and the extent to which reported accounting profits are supported by cash profits (Accruals).The 
Beneish M-Score has been shown to correctly identify 76% of manipulators on an out of sample 
basis (Beneish, 1999).  
The original M-Score formula is: 
M-Score = -4.84 + 0.92*DSRI + 0.528*GMI + 0.404*AQI + 0.892*SGI + 0.115*DEPI – 
0.172*SGAI + 4.679*TATA – 0.327*LVGI 
Where, 
Factor Name Formula Basis 
DSRI Days’ Sales in Receivables Receivables / Total Sales  This Year / 
15 | P a g e  
 
Index Last Year 
GMI Gross Margin Index Gross Profit / Total Sales 
Last Year / 
This Year 
AQI Asset Quality Index 
(Non-Current Assets – PP&E) / Total 
Assets 
This Year / 
Last Year 
SGI Sales Growth Index Total Sales 
This Year / 
Last Year 
DEPI Depreciation Index 
Depreciation / (Depreciation + Net 
PP&E) 
Last Year / 
This Year 
SGAI SG&A Expense Index SG&A / Revenues 
This Year / 
Last Year 
TATA 
Total Accruals to Total 
Assets 
(Working Capital – Cash) – 
Depreciation/ Total Assets 
This Year / 
Last Year 
LVGI Leverage Index Total Debt / Total Assets 
This Year / 
Last Year 
The total sale is measured as the average net sales. The total debt is measured as the sum of debt 
in current liabilities and the total long-term debt. In this original model, Beneish found that firms 
that scored greater than -2.22 were more likely to be earnings manipulators.   
 Dependent Variable 
 Regarding the dependent variable, I include a binary variable to indicate if the firm has 
been involved in a lawsuit since 1995. I obtained data on filings of the Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse (SCAC). The SCAC provides detailed information relating to the prosecution, 
defense, and settlement of federal class action securities fraud litigation. The SCAC team 
maintains a Filings database of more than 3,800 securities class action lawsuits filed since the 
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The database has concentrated 
resources on the data gathering methodologies. The SCAC does not track lawsuits filed in state 
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court where there is no parallel federal civil class action, nor does it track SEC enforcement 
proceedings when there is no parallel federal civil class action (SCAC website).  
c. Measuring the Relationship between Credit Ratings and Litigation Risk 
 
After constructing a model of litigation risk, I estimate the firms’ predicted litigation risk 
over the time period given the coefficients and constant that I find in the regression. Then I 
calculate the difference in litigation risk between the first year recorded and the last year 
recorded for each firm in sample. Since the regression of credit ratings on the predicted litigation 
risk finds a highly significant positive coefficient on the independent variable, I also include the 
change of litigation risk from the previous year to the current year to see if the positive 
correlation still exists. Another independent variable is the litigation risk squared since I want to 
test if there is a convergence of the correlation in the long-term. I use the current credit ratings 
from Standard & Poor Quality Ratings on the CRSP/Compustat merged database. 
The model of credit ratings is: 
Ratings=β0+β1 (LITIGATIONR) +β2 (CHANGELITIGATIONR) + β3 (LITIGATIONR2) +β4 
(FIRMSIZE) +β5 (CAPSTRUC) +β6 (ROA) +β7 (ROE) +β8 (OANCF) +β9 (INTCOV) +ε  
 I include several control variables other than litigation risk, which can potentially affect 
the credit ratings. The first control variable is firm size. Firm size is an indicator of economies of 
scale in both aspects of production and organization, thus the size of a firm is expected to affect 
the investment opportunity and future growth (Smith, Watts 1992). Altamuro (2009) argues that 
larger companies are more likely than smaller firms to get a high credit rating due to their good 
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reputation and diversification. I measure the firm size by the log of the samples’ total assets, 
which is also included as one of the variables in the Altamuro (2009) paper.  
 The way of financing for finance business operations affects the financial structure of 
firms. Thus, capital structure measured as debt to equity ratio indicates the financial risk, the 
creditor risk, and the growth opportunities.  Kisgen (2006) confirms that ratings react differently 
to the leverage since there is a trend of downgrade after lowering leverage due to the decision of 
capital structure of a firm. Thus, I measure the capital structure as a ratio of total debt (long-term 
debt DLTT + debt in current liabilities DLC) over equity (SEQ). 
 To control for the impact of financial risk, I include the return of asset (ROA) as a proxy 
for profitability, which was calculated as net income (NI) over total assets (AT). I also include 
the return on equity (ROE), which was calculated as net income (NI) /total shareholders’ equity 
(SEQ). Both ROA and ROE are important measurements of firms’ performance and future 
profitability, thus these two ratios largely affect the decisions of shareholders and the ratings 
from credit agencies.   
In order to measure the health of ongoing business, I include the operating cash flow 
(OANCF). Another control variable is the interest coverage calculated as earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) divided by the interest or related expense (XINT) for long-term debt. Both the 
health of operating activities and the ability to pay back creditors are important indicators for 
credit agencies to be aware of when creating ratings.  
Dependent Variable 
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I use the S&P Quality Ranking as a dependent variable, which is an appraisal of past 
performance of a stock's earnings and dividends and the stock's relative standing as of a 
company's current fiscal year-end. Growth and stability of earnings and dividends are key 
elements in establishing Standard & Poor's quality rankings for Common or Ordinary Stock. In 
the sample, firms have ratings of A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, C, D, I range them from 1 to 8, where 1 
is the lowest rating and 8 is the highest. 
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
a. The Model of Litigation Risk 
 
I obtained data on firm characteristics from CRSP/Compustata merged database from 
year 2003 to 2013. I searched the entire database in order to get a large sample and diverse 
distribution of industries in the sample. Thus, I got a total number of 9,658 firms. Excluding the 
firms that do not have sufficient data regarding firm characteristics that I use in the model of 
litigation risk, I got 7,519 firms left with sufficient data. Table 1, Panel A provides the definition 
of data and the calculation method of variables in the model of litigation risk.  
Table 2, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics in the model of litigation risk. The 
mean of the market value is U.S. $3948.17. Using the market value of firms, the first quartile 
which is the market value below or equal to U.S. $89.2101 is marked “1” in the binary variable 
of small firm indicator. Similarly, the last quartile which is the market value above or equal to 
U.S. $1748.702 is marked “1” in the binary variable of big firm indicator. Table 2, Panel A (1) 
provides correlation between variables in the model of litigation risk. 
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Previous literature suggests that the FPS industries tend to have litigation rates that 
exceed the overall rate (Skinner et al. 2012). To include the FPS industry proxy, I used a binary 
variable to show the industry membership. Firms included in FPS industries are marked “1” as 
highly risky industries. According to the FPS industry membership, highly risky industries 
include: biotech firms (classified as firms in SIC codes 2833-2838 and 8731-8734), computer 
firms (classified as firms in SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics firms (classified 
as firms in SIC codes 3600-3674), and retail firms (classified as firms in SIC codes 5200-5961).  
The Beneish M-Score determines whether a company has manipulated its earnings. The 
mean of -3.80 indicates that on average sample firms do not have intention of manipulating 
earnings given Beneish’s estimation that a score above -2.22 indicates earnings manipulation. 
Table 1, Panel B provides the detail of the variables in calculating the BM-Score. 
I obtained data on filings of securities class action lawsuits from the Stanford Law School 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. The data started in 1995 and continue through the 
present. I includeed lawsuits filed against public companies since the data on firm characteristics 
is only applied to publicly traded firms (listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ), excluding 
the IPO allocation, mutual fund, and analyst lawsuits. The binary sued variable indicates whether 
the firm has been since 1995 when filings data became available. I also collected the number of 
lawsuits that one firm had in the given time period of the database used as one of the variables 
for measuring the relationship between credit ratings and litigation risk. Table 3, Panel A and 
Panel B provide the number of lawsuits by year and sector.  
b. The Model of Credit Ratings 
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I used the credit ratings from Standard & Poor Quality Ranking in the current period 
provided by CRSP/Compustat merged dataset. The S&P Quality Ranking provides an indicator 
of past performance of a firm’s stock earnings and performance as of a firm’s current fiscal year-
end. Growth and stability of earnings and dividends are key elements in establishing the rating 
for Common/Ordinary stock. Table 1, Panel C provides the definition of variables in the model 
of credit ratings, including the control variables definition.  
The S&P Quality Rating has score as A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, C, D. Thus, I ranked the 
rating into a scale of eight. In my sample, eight is the best rating as A+ and one is the worst 
rating as D. The litigation risk is an independent variable measured by the predictions using the 
parameters gained from the litigation risk model. I also included the change of litigation risk 
from this year to last year’s level and the litigation risk squared to test for convergence. The 
control variables are firm size, capital structure measured as the debt to equity ratio, return on 
asset, return on equity, operating cash flow, and interest coverage ratio.   
V. Results  
 
a. Litigation Risk Probit Regression 
 
I report descriptive statistics in Table 2. Panel A reports means and medians for the 
variables used in the model of litigation risk. Mean market value for these firms is U.S. $3948m 
with the book-to-market ratio of 7.73. Both the working capital and the BM-score have a 
negative skewness. The mean BM-score is -3.8, indicating the mean does not show a sign of 
earnings manipulation.  
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Panel A (1) of Table 2 reports correlations among the variables in the model of litigation 
risk. The indicator of litigation is positively correlated with the market value (0.168), change in 
market value (0.074), working capital (0.065), gross profit (0.166), R&D intensity (0.065), big 
firm indicator (0.173) and FPS proxy (0.180). The indicator is negatively correlated with book-
to-market ratio (-0.003), firm financial risk (-0.048), stock volatility (-0.005), price/earnings ratio 
(0.010), BM-score (-0.013), and small firm indicator (-0.170). The market value and gross profit 
drive litigation risk the most because of the large positive correlation. The firm size indicator 
suggests that the bigger the firm, the more likely it is to be involved in lawsuits. On the other 
hand, the smaller the firm, the less likely it is to be involved in lawsuits. FPS proxy is positively 
correlated with market value (0.022), change in market value (0.013), working capital (0.051), 
gross profit (0.017), and R&D intensity (0.276). It is negatively correlated with book-to-market 
ratio (-0.003), firm financial risk (-0.146), stock volatility (-0.003), and price/earnings ratio (-
0.009), big firm indicator (-0.039) and small firm indicator (-0.003). It is consistent that the FPS 
dummy variable is associated with variables that drive litigation risk.  
Table 4 reports the results of binomial probit regression of the lawsuit dummy variable on 
the FPS dummy variable, big firm indicator, small firm indicator, and the other firm 
characteristics variables. The first model uses only the FPS industry dummy (Model 1). The 
coefficient on this variable is positive and highly significant, indicating that FPS industry 
membership increases the probability of litigation. Though the coefficient on the FPS variable is 
significantly correlated to firms’ litigation risk in this model, overall goodness of fit and 
predictive ability are low according to the Pseudo-R-squared of 2.86%.  
The next models (denoted 2-4) that report probit regressions include the market value, 
book-to-market ratio, working capital, firm financial risk, stock volatility, price to earnings ratio, 
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gross profit, research & development intensity, BM-score, big-firm indicator, small-firm 
indicator and the FPS proxy dummy variable. Market value and working capital are positively 
associated with litigation risk, indicating that higher market capitalization and operational 
liquidity lead to higher litigation risk. Book-to-market value is negatively associated with 
litigation risk, implying that overvalued firms are likely to be involved in lawsuit cases. The firm 
financial risk is measured as the proportion of the tangible assets. The negative coefficient is 
consistent with the hypothesis that tangible assets serve as a cushion if a firm is involved in 
financial distress. Though the stock volatility is negatively associated with litigation risk, the 
magnitude is small and the coefficient is not statistically significant. A higher price to earnings 
ratio suggests that investors are expecting higher earnings growth in the future compared to firms 
with a lower P/E ratio, thus it is negatively associated with litigation risk. Both gross profit and 
R&D intensity have positive coefficients, indicating that higher profits and investment in future 
research and development are positive signals to creditors and investors, thus decreasing 
litigation risk. The Beneish M-score has less impact on litigation risk compared to firm size 
indicator. However, according to the coefficients, big firms are more likely to have higher risk 
whereas small firms are not. FPS Proxy is also positively associated with litigation risk and is 
statistically significant in these models, with a marginal effect of 0.152 in Model 4. It indicates 
that FPS industry membership increases the probability of litigation by 15.2%. At a 1% 
significance level, firm financial risk decreases the probability of litigation by 11.2% and R&D 
intensity increases the probability of litigation risk by 7.88%. Big firm indicator increases the 
litigation by 9.90% and small firm indicator decreases the litigation risk by 13.7%.  
b. Credit Ratings OLS Regression 
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I report descriptive statistics in Table 2. Panel B reports means and medians for the variables 
in the model of credit ratings. Mean firm size for these firms is U.S. $2.46m with debt-to-equity 
ratio of 0.524. Both capital structure and return on assets have a negative skewness. Mean 
interest coverage ratio is 44, indicating that most firms in my sample, regardless of industry, are 
generating sufficient cash to cover its interest payments.   
Panel B (1) of Table 2 reports correlations among the variables in the model of credit ratings. 
The ratings have a positive correlation with every variable; and only the correlations of change in 
litigation risk and capital structure are not statistically significant at better than 1% level.  
Table 5 reports the results of regression of the credit ratings on the litigation risk 
measured in the previous model, change in the litigation risk, the level of litigation risk squared 
and other control variables. Model 1 uses only the level of litigation risk. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient on this variable is positive and highly statistically significant. Then I include the 
change in the level of litigation risk of one year with respect to the previous year and the 
litigation risk squared to see if the results change. It turns out that the change in litigation risk has 
a negative association with the litigation risk and is statistically significant at 5% significance 
level. Since the level of litigation risk is effectively a zero or one variable in terms of values. 
This means that it is mean reverting and is negatively correlated with change in litigation risk. 
Thus, I only include the change in litigation risk in the Model 3. I also include other control 
variables in Model 3 such as firm size, capital structure measured as debt-to-equity ratio, return 
on asset, return on equity, operating cash flow, and interest coverage ratio. The change in 
litigation risk has a positive coefficient in Model 3 but is not statistically significant. All the 
control variables are positively associated with litigation risk. The coefficient of capital structure 
is the only one that is not statistically significant in the regression.  
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According to the marginal effects, at a 1% significance level, the additional increase in 
firm size increases the ratings by 61.9%; the additional increase in return on asset increases the 
ratings by 7.01%; the additional increase in operating cash flow increases the ratings by 0.004%; 
and the additional increase in the interest coverage ratio increases the ratings by 0.0027%. Firm 
size, ROA, operating cash flow, and interest rate coverage are significantly correlated with credit 
ratings in a positive sign. The coefficient on ROE is significant at 10% level. However, I do not 
find significance of the coefficient on the capital structure.  
Without controlling for other firm characteristics and with a single variable of litigation 
risk, the credit rating is highly significant correlated with litigation risk in a positive sign. In 
order to test for the consistency of this relationship, I include change in litigation risk and 
litigation risk squared. I find that the change in litigation risk is negatively associated with credit 
rating at a 5% significance level. The highly significant and positive correlation between the 
litigation risk squared and credit ratings suggests that the relationship can be exponential instead 
of linear.  
c. Discussion of Fixed Effects 
 
In my sample, there are 7,519 firms and data of firm characteristics observed from year 
2003 to 2013. Since the change in a firm’s fiscal years and the differences among firms can 
cause an effect on the credit ratings as dependent variable, I want to investigate the fixed effects 
of firms and that of years. 
First, I generated a panel data for both firms’ SIC codes and fiscal years. However, it is 
not applicable to create a dummy variable for each firm due to the large number of observations. 
Furthermore, I expect that there would not be many changes in coefficients on independent 
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variables in the model of credit ratings since the results have already applied to a population of 
firms. On the other hand, the industry fixed effects, which I included as a FPS proxy in the 
measurement of litigation risk, is more relevant to credit ratings because it describes the 
difference in economic environment and job functions. 
After creating a dummy variable for firms, I was able to control the year fixed effect in 
the credit ratings model. There are no big changes in the coefficient of the independent variables 
included in the model in terms of magnitudes and signs. Nevertheless, the negative correlation 
between the change in litigation risk and credit ratings remains the same after including other 
factors in the model, which is contrary to what I found in the model of credit ratings without 
controlling for year fixed effects. I also find that the year 2007 has a negative coefficient with the 
ratings, which contradicts to the positive coefficient of all other fiscal years. It is not surprising 
since firms tend to have financial problems and downward performance during the financial 
crisis in year 2007 and 2008, thus decreasing their ratings provided by agencies.  
d. Discussion of Endogeneity  
 
There is a problem of endogeneity in this paper because of an endogenous influence 
between firms’ litigation risk and credit ratings. The credit ratings as a dependent variable is 
correlated with the change in litigation risk as an independent variable. And the change in 
litigation risk also has an effect on the credit ratings of firms. Another source of endogeneity of 
this model can come from omitted variable. Though I have controlled for other factors in the 
model of credit ratings, there can be potentially other omitted variables that significantly affect 
credit ratings. In this case, the shift of sign on the coefficient of the change in litigation risk can 
be affected by an omitted variable that is strongly correlated with credit ratings as well as the 
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change in litigation risk. The problem of endogeneity can introduce bias in the regression 
coefficient of the OLS regression of credit ratings.  
One of the ways to address the problem of endogeneity is to find instrumental variables. 
In the model of credit ratings, an effective instrumental variable will be a variable that we can be 
fairly certain that it has an effect on the independent variable i.e. the change in the litigation risk 
but not on the dependent variable i.e. the credit ratings. A best instrumental variable should be 
randomly selected but satisfied all the conditions mentioned above (University College London: 
Environmental Econometrics).  
 Some possible instruments include the compensation for CEOs and geographic location 
which implies information about population, average income level and socioeconomic status. 
However, I find that most firms choose their incorporated location because of other factors such 
as tax environment, cost saving, and logistics access. Another possibility is firm size. It makes 
more sense to measure it as market capitalization, which means I need to drop the market value 
variable in the model of litigation risk, which is a highly significant variable in the probit 
regression. Developing an instrumental variable approach to deal with potential endogeneity is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is a worthwhile avenue for future research.  
VI. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, I provide two empirical models: one is an alternative model of litigation 
risk, and the other is a model of credit ratings on the change of litigation risk, controlling for 
other relevant variables. I define litigation risk as the risk of private securities class action 
lawsuits. According to previous studies, litigation rates in the four FPS industries 
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(biotechnology, computers, electronics, and retail) are consistently higher than those in other 
industries. I find that FPS proxy measure is highly correlated with litigation risk since the 
coefficient on this variable is both economically and statistically significant. However, the ability 
of this variable to predict litigation is modest given a small Pseudo-R-squared of 2.86%. When 
the FPS variable is augmented with measures of firm characteristics such as market value, 
working capital, stock volatility and R&D intensity, predictive ability increases markedly, 
suggesting that the inclusion of the firm characteristics can result in significant improvements in 
model performance.  
 The main contribution of this paper includes constructing a new model that measures 
litigation risk and examines the negative relationship between firms’ litigation risk and credit 
ratings. By supplementing the FPS industry proxy with measures of firm characteristics, the 
predictive ability of the model measuring litigation risk improves. This suggests that industry 
membership is not the only factor that affects firms’ litigation risk. When we assess firms’ 
litigation risk to predict their likelihood of involvement in lawsuits, it is important to consider 
both systematic risk from industry and macro-economic environment and firm-specific risk 
measured by firm characteristics such as market capitalization, book-to-market ratio and stock 
volatility. In the model of credit ratings, I find that the change of litigation risk has a negative 
correlation with the credit ratings. However, the negative coefficient on the change of litigation 
risk changes to a positive one after controlling for other variables such as firm size, return on 
asset, and interest coverage ratio. This is surprising because litigation risk in and of itself can 
cause severe financial damage and reputational crisis. The result implies that the credit ratings of 
firms from a credit agency may not incorporate a single factor specifically, such as litigation risk. 
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Analysts or investors need to look at different factors that significantly affect firms’ credibility 
instead of relying completely on the credit ratings provided by agencies.   
 I used the suggested model of litigation risk to generate the level of litigation risk over 
the years in the sample. I also calculated the change in the litigation risk from this year to the 
previous year’s level and the litigation risk squared to see if there is a convergent effect. The 
result of the regression suggests that the change in the litigation risk is negatively correlated with 
the credit ratings. I excluded the level of litigation risk since it is effectively a zero one variable, 
which is mean reverting. Nevertheless, I find that the negative correlation shifts to a positive one 
when I control for the variables that can potentially affect credit ratings such as firm size, capital 
structure, and return on equity. Furthermore, I created a year dummy variable to control for the 
year fixed effects. I find that the negative correlation between the change in litigation risk and 
credit ratings sustains even after including other factors that potentially affect credit ratings in the 
model, which is contrary to what I find in the previous model of credit ratings without 
controlling for year fixed effects. I also find that the year 2007 has a negative coefficient with the 
ratings, which contradicts to the positive coefficient of all other fiscal years. It is not surprising 
since firms tend to have financial damages and downward performance during the financial crisis 
in year 2007 and 2008, thus downgrading their ratings provided by agencies. The shifting sign 
can also be aroused due to the problem of endogeneity, which could possibly be caused by 
omitted variables. The issue of endogeneity needs to be further addressed in future research.
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Appendix 
Table 1 
            Variable Definition 
            This table provides definitions of the variables used in the regression.  
       For all non-stock return and volatility, the year t represents the fiscal year of the company. 
     
             Panel A. Variables of measurement of litigation risk 
        Variable Definition                     
SUED Defined as a binary variable that 0 represents no lawsuit in the past, 1 represents lawsuit existed in the past 
 CHANGEMKVALT The change of market value of a firm from time t-1 to time t 
    MKVALT Market value for single issue companies is common shares outstanding multiplied by the month-end price 
 
 
 that corresponds to the period end date 
        BKMK Book-to-market equity ratio is measured as the book value divided by the market value. The book value is 
 
 
defined as the multiplication of the book value per share and common shares outstanding 
   WC Working capital is measured as the difference between the total current asset and the total current liability.  
 
 
The total current asset is the sum of:  
        
 
(1)cash and short-term investments (2)current assets (3)inventories (4)receivables;  
   
 
The total current liability is the sum of:  
        
 
(1)accounts payable (2)current liabilities (3)debt in current liabilities (4)income taxes payable 
  FINRK The information in financial risk is measured as the total net property, plant, and equipment divided by the total assets  
VOLATILITY The stock volatility is calculated by the difference between the annual closing price at time t and  
  
 
the annual closing price at time t-1 divided by the annual closing price at time t-1 
    PE The price/earnings ratio is calculated by dividing the annual closing price over basic earnings per share  
  
 
excluding extraordinary items 
         GP According to U.S. and Canadian GAAP definition, the gross profit is the difference of sales/turnover (net)  
 
 
less cost of goods sold 
         RD INTEN The intensity of research and development is calculated by dividing the research and development expense over   
 
Total assets. The research and development expense includes software expenses, amortization of software costs, 
 
 
and company-sponsored research and development 
      FPSPROXY A binary variable as indicator of FPS industry membership in the sample   
BIG A binary variable as indicator of big firms, which is the first quartile of firms in terms of the market value   
SMALL A binary variable as indicator of small firms, which is the last quartile of firms in terms of the market value   
BMSCORE The Beineish M-score determines whether a company has manipulated its earnings. The formula is  
  
 
M-Score = -4.84 + 0.92*DSRI + 0.528*GMI + 0.404*AQI + 0.892*SGI + 0.115*DEPI – 0.172*SGAI + 4.679*TATA – 0.327*LVGI.  
 (Factors defined in Panel B)                   
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Panel B. Variables of the BM-Score formula 
         (All the index is defined as the ratio of this year over last year) 
       Variable Definition                     
DSRI Days' sales in receivables index is measured as the receivables divided by total sales 
   GMI The gross margin index is measured as the gross profit over total sales 
     AQI Asset quality index is measure as (noncurrent assets-PP&E) over total assets 
    SGI Sales growth index is measured as total sales 
       DEPI Depreciation index is measured as depreciation divided by (depreciation + net PP&E) 
   SGAI Selling, General & Administrative expense index is measured as SG&A/revenues. The SG&A represents all  
 
 
commercial expenses of operation incurred in the regular course of business pertaining to the securing of operating income 
TATA Total accruals to total assets is measured as (working capital-cash)-depreciation/total assets 
   LVGI The leverage index is measured as total debt over total assets. The total debt is calculated as the debt in  
   current liabilities plus the total long-term debt               
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Panel C. Variables of the credit rating regression 
         Variable Definition                     
RATINGS S&P Quality Ranking is an appraisal of past performance of a stock's earnings and dividends and the stock's relative standing 
as of a company's current fiscal year-end. Growth and stability of earnings and dividends are key elements in establishing  
Standard & Poor's quality rankings for Common/Ordinary Stock. In the sample, firms have ratings of A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, C, D, 
I  
range them from 1 to 8, where 1 being the lowest rating and 8 being the highest rating 
 
 LITIGATIONR Measurement of litigation risk from the regression 
       CHANGELITIGATION
R 
The change of litigation risk measured by the model from time t-1 to 
time t        
LITIGATIONR2 The level of litigation risk squared 
FIRMSIZE The firm size is measured by the log of the samples' sales/turnover (net). The sales/turnover (net) represents gross sales  
 
reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, and returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers 
CAPSTRUC The capital structure is a ratio of total debt (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) over equity. The shareholders' equity  
 
represents the common and preferred shareholders' interest in the company 
    ROA The return on asset is measured as the ratio of net income over total assets. The net income represents the fiscal period  
 
income or loss reported by a company after subtracting expenses and losses from all revenues and gains 
 ROE The return on equity is measured as net income over total shareholders' equity 
    OANCF The operating activities net cash flow represents the net change in cash from all items classified in the operating activities 
 
 section on a cash flow statement 
        INTCOV The interest coverage is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over interest or related expense    
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Table 2 
         Descriptive statistics. 
        This table presents descriptive statistics used in the regression. 
      
          Panel A. Variables in the model of litigation risk 
       
  MKVALT BKMK WC 
FINR
K 
VOLAT
ILITY  PE GP RD INTEN BM-score 
          Variables in litigation risk measurement 
       Mean 3948.170 7.728 277.856 0.224 1.143 13.225 1046.618 0.054 -3.803 
Standard Error 88.946 7.210 15.839 0.001 0.133 0.556 24.089 0.001 0.704 
Median 389.975 0.495 38.106 0.132 0.008 14.081 113.424 0.000 -2.133 
Standard Deviation 17299.205 1402.261 3080.664 0.237 25.803 108.201 4685.195 0.193 136.892 
Sample Variance 299262476.55 1966334.75 9490493.55 0.056 
665.77
0 11707.553 21951052.88 0.037 18739.536 
Kurtosis 226.290 37826.811 7005.353 0.604 
8089.4
23 985.879 193.387 940.420 25306.578 
Skewness 12.453 194.490 -68.939 1.256 82.079 12.980 12.168 22.135 -148.122 
Range 626550.352 273499.264 393844.000 0.996 
3000.0
00 11176.000 130131.000 12.853 27330.015 
Minimum 0.001 -769.316 -329795.000 0.000 -1.000 -3479.000 -6887.000 -0.010 -24030.229 
Maximum 626550.353 272729.948 64049.000 0.996 
2999.0
00 7697.000 123244.000 12.843 3299.786 
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Panel A (1). Correlations  
          
  SUED 
MK
VAL
T 
CHANGEMK
TVALT BKMK WC 
FINR
K 
VOLATIL
ITY  PE GP 
RD 
INT
EN BMscore Big Small 
FPS 
prox
y 
SUED 1              
MKVALT 0.1637 1             
CHANGEMK
TVALT 
0.0741 0.5641 1            
BKMK -0.0028 -0.0012 -0.0007 1           
 WC 0.0652 0.2571 0.1582 -0.0002 1          
FINRK -0.0480 0.0529 0.0257 0.0099 -0.008 1         
VOLATILIT
Y  
-0.0053 -0.0048 -0.0026 0.0798 -0.002 0.0179 1        
PE -0.0097 0.0149 0.0170 -0.0006 0.0026 0.0047 -0.0026 1       
GP 0.1658 0.8747 0.4019 -0.0012 0.1636 0.0473 -0.0042 0.0074 1      
 RD INTEN 0.0645 -0.0308 -0.0155 -0.0015 -0.002 -0.128 0.0060 -0.0275 -0.0378 1     
BMscore -0.0130 0.0019 0.0011 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0010 0.0016 0.0004 1    
 Big 0.1730 0.3574 0.1857 -0.0030 0.1128 0.1746 -0.0122 0.0273 0.3353 -0.092 0.0052 1   
Small -0.1705 -0.1304 -0.0656 0.0089 -0.050 -0.131 0.0339 -0.0345 -0.1259 0.0963 0.0043 -0.3333 1  
FPS proxy 0.1801 0.0222 0.0128 -0.0034 0.0507 -0.146 -0.0033 -0.0094 0.0166 0.2757 0.0011 -0.0389 -0.0032 1 
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Panel B.  Variables in the credit rating regression 
  FIRMSIZE CAPSTRUC ROA ROE OANCF INTCOV 
       Mean 2.4600 0.5238 -0.0463 -0.0307 394.9673 44.7322 
Standard Error 0.0053 0.3446 0.0047 0.0592 13.0409 7.3142 
Median 2.4875 0.3517 0.0221 0.0801 27.1815 1.5186 
Standard Deviation 1.0337 67.0278 0.9202 11.5062 2536.3815 1422.5660 
Sample Variance 1.0685 4492.7196 0.8468 132.3937 6433230.9899 2023694.0205 
Kurtosis 0.6012 9131.8455 7925.0196 4935.2396 752.4882 3223.3465 
Skewness -0.3395 -71.6829 -80.7749 4.5688 16.3924 42.6775 
Range 8.6695 11380.3737 104.8468 1821.0922 240291.0000 175475.0000 
Minimum -3.0000 -7811.0000 -100.0140 -819.7857 -110560.0000 -54263.0000 
Maximum 5.6695 3569.3737 4.8328 1001.3065 129731.0000 121212.0000 
35 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B (1). Correlations          
  Ratings LITIGATIONR CHANGELITIGATIONR FIRMSIZE CAPSTRUC ROA ROE OANCF INTCOV 
Ratings 1 
        LITIGATIONR 0.0681 1 
       CHANGELITIGATIONR 0.0061 0.6902 1 
      FIRMSIZE 0.4508 0.1045 0.0055 1 
     CAPSTRUC 0.0029 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0035 1 
    ROA 0.1146 0.0012 -0.0027 0.1637 0.0010 1 
   ROE 0.0130 0.0002 0.0002 0.0165 -0.4529 0.0011 1 
  OANCF 0.1790 0.0863 0.0097 0.2794 0.0006 0.0200 0.0031 1 
 INTCOV 0.0456 0.0029 0.0011 0.0436 -0.0003 0.0286 0.0029 0.0010 1 
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Table 3 
 Lawsuits data set description.  
The Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) has 3, 864 total Filings on the date of writing. 
  Panel A: Number of lawsuits by year 
 
  
 
(Source: data in the graph collected on the SCAC website) 
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Panel B: Number of lawsuits by sector 
 
  
 
(Source: data in the graph collected on the SCAC website) 
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Table 4 
         Models of litigation risk. 
        This table represents the FPS only model in comparison to the multivariate models with firm characteristics variables. 
Model 1 is the probit model with the FPS variable. Model 2 adds firm characteristics with specific values, and Model 3 
adds variables indicating firm size effect and  the earnings management. Model 4 includes all variables. ***,**,and *  
indicate z-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The z-values are based on robust standard errors that control for  
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Marginal effects of the coefficients are reported below the coefficients 
in Model 4. 
         
          Sued=β0+β1 (FPSPROXY)+ε 
        
          Sued=β0+β1 (FPSPROXY)+β2 (MKVALT)+ β3 (BKMK)+β4 (WC)+β5 (FINRK)+β6 (VOLATILITY)+β7 (PE)+β8 (GP)+β9 (RDINTEN)+ε 
          Sued=β0+β1 (FPSPROXY)+β2 (BMSCORE)+β3 (BIG)+β4 (SMALL)+ε 
    
          Sued=β0+β1 (FPSPROXY)+β2 (MKVALT)+ β3 (BKMK)+β4 (WC)+β5 (FINRK)+β6 (VOLATILITY)+β7 (PE)+β8 (GP)+β9 (RDINTEN) 
             +β10 (BMSCORE)+β11 (BIG)+β12 (SMALL)+ε 
      
              Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4   
INTERCEPT 
 
-0.9110 *** -0.9371 *** -0.9425 *** -0.8594 *** 
        
0.0000 *** 
FPSPROXY 
 
0.5184 *** 0.4854 *** 0.5620 *** 0.4930 *** 
        
0.1518965 *** 
MKVALT 
   
0.0000049 *** 
  
0.0000019 ** 
        
0.0000005 ** 
BKMK 
   
-0.00202 ** 
  
-0.00139 
 
        
-0.00040 
 WC 
   
0.0000286 *** 
  
0.00000947 ** 
        
2.71E-06 ** 
FINRK 
   
-0.19347 *** 
  
-0.39147 *** 
        
-0.11225 *** 
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VOLATILITY 
   
-0.000454 ** 
  
0.000028 
 
        
0.000008 
 PE 
   
-0.000126 ** 
  
-0.000218 *** 
        
-0.000063 *** 
GP 
   
0.000040 *** 
  
0.000028 *** 
        
0.000008 *** 
RDINTEN 
   
0.143819 *** 
  
0.274727 *** 
        
0.0787736 *** 
BMSOCDRE 
     
-0.00020 *** -0.00021 ** 
        
-0.00006 ** 
BIG 
     
0.41641 *** 0.32509 *** 
        
0.09905 *** 
SMALL 
     
-0.5129161 *** -0.538201 *** 
        
-0.1369096 *** 
          Pseudo R2 
 
0.0286 
 
0.0564 
 
0.0748 
 
0.0896 
 Observation Count   37827   37827   37827   37827   
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Table 5 
         Models of credit ratings. 
       This table represents the regression of credit ratings on litigation risk and other control variables. 
Model 1 is the regression on the level of litigation risk. Model 2 adds the change in litigation risk 
and the litigation risk squared. Model 3 includes all control variables. ***,**,and * indicate p-values   
of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The p-values are based on robust standard errors that control for  
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  
     
          Ratings=β0+β1 (LITIGATIONR)+ε 
      
          Ratings=β0+β1 (LITIGATIONR)+β2 (CHANGELITIGATIONR)+ β3 (LITIGATIONR2)+ε 
  
          Ratings=β0+β1 (LITIGATIONR)+β2 (CHANGELITIGATIONR)+ β3 (LITIGATIONR2)+β4 (FIRMSIZE) 
              +β5 (CAPSTRUC)+β6 (ROA)+β7 (ROE)+β8 (OANCF)+β9 (INTCOV)+ε 
   
              Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3   
  INTERCEPT 3.5065 *** 4.1471 *** 1.9295 *** 
  
          LITIGATIONR 0.0509 *** 0.8519 *** 
    CHANGELITIGATIONR 
 
-0.00639 ** 0.00177 
   LITIGATIONR2 
  
0.00220 *** 
    
          FIRMSIZE 
     
0.61943 *** 
  CAPSTRUC 
    
0.00011 
   ROA 
     
0.07008 *** 
  ROE 
     
0.00103 * 
  OANCF 
     
0.00004 *** 
  INTCOV 
     
0.00003 *** 
  
          Adjusted R2 0.0046 
 
0.0678 
 
0.2087 
   Observation Count 37827   37827   37827   
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